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TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-SOCIAL

HOST LIABILITY-The

New Jersey

Supreme Court has held that a social host who provides liquor to
an adult guest, knowing both that the guest is intoxicated and that
the guest will thereafter operate a motor vehicle, is liable for injuries to third parties caused by the subsequent drunken driving of
that adult guest.
Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has established itself at the vanguard of societal concern over drunk driving with its unprecedented decision in Kelly v. Gwinnell.1 In Kelly, the court held that
a social host who provided liquor to an adult guest, knowing both
that the guest was intoxicated and that the guest would thereafter
operate a motor vehicle, was liable for the consequences of the subsequent drunken driving of the adult guest.'
On the evening of January 11, 1980, Donald Gwinnell drove Joseph Zak to his home and remained at the Zak residence for approximately two hours.' During that time, Mr. and Mrs. Zak provided Gwinnell with "two or three drinks" of scotch.4
Approximately twenty-five minutes after Gwinnell had departed
from the Zak residence, Joseph Zak called Gwinnell's home to confirm that Gwinnell had arrived there safely. 5 Zak was informed by
Mrs. Gwinnell that her husband had been involved in a head-on
collision with an automobile driven by Marie E. Kelly.' As a result
of the collision, Ms. Kelly was seriously injured.7
Following the accident, Gwinnell was subjected to a blood test
which revealed a blood alcohol level of 0.286 percent.8 Based upon
1. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
2. Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224. The court further held that the social host and guest
were liable to Ms. Kelly as joint tortfeasors. Id. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230. No opinion was
expressed, however, concerning the rights of one to contribution or indemnification from the
other. Id.
3. Id. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. In New Jersey, a person driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 percent or greater is deemed to be driving under the influence of an intoxicating liquor and in
violation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50, as amended by, 1983 N.J. Laws c.129. Id. at 541 n.1,
476 A.2d at 1220 n.1.
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such a blood alcohol concentration, an expert retained by Ms.
Kelly reached the following conclusions: first, that Gwinnell had
not consumed two or three scotches, but rather the equivalent of
thirteen drinks; second, that Gwinnell must have evidenced unmistakable signs of intoxication while he was at the Zak home; and
third, that Gwinnell was severely intoxicated both while at the Zak
residence and at the time of the accident.'
Ms. Kelly thereafter sued Gwinnell, who in turn sued the Zaks in
a third party action.10 In response to the action, the Zaks moved
for summary judgment on the basis that as a matter of law, a social
host was immune from any liability which stemmed from the negligence of an adult guest who became intoxicated while at the host's
home." The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. 2 Although the granting of the motion was only an interlocutory order, the trial court nevertheless entered a final judgment in
favor of Mr. and Mrs. Zak so that an immediate appeal could be
taken.' 3 In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Appellate
Division1 4 first noted that New Jersey had no dram shop act to
provide guidance. A survey of the state's decisions revealed, however, that the New Jersey courts had traditionally imposed liability
upon commercial licensees.' 5 Dispositive of the issue for the Appellate Division was the fact that liability had been judicially extended to a social host only in situations where the guest was a
minor.' 6 The Appellate Division therefore expressly refused to extend liability to the social host in the instant case, relying on the
9. 96 N.J. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
10. Id. at 541-42, 476 A.2d at 1220. Ms. Kelly subsequently amended her complaint to
also name Mr. and Mrs. Zak as direct defendants. Id.
11. Id. at 542, 476 A.2d at 1220-21.
12. Id. at 542, 476 A.2d at 1221.
13. Id. The order granting the Zaks' motion for summary judgment was interlocutory
because the merits of Ms. Kelly's claim against the driver, Gwinnell, had yet to be determined. Id. The final judgment was entered pursuant to Rule of Court 4:42-2 which provides
in pertinent part:
4:42-2. Judgment Upon Multiple Claims
In any action the trial court may direct the entry of final judgment upon less than
all of the claims as to all parties only upon a complete adjudication of a separable
claim or upon complete adjudication of all of the rights and liabilities asserted in the
litigation as to any party . . ..
1985 RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY (West Supp. 1985). 96
N.J. at 542, 476 A.2d at 1221.
14. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 190 N.J. Super. 320, 463 A.2d 387 (1983).
15. 96 N.J. at 542, 476 A.2d at 1221.
16. Id.
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fact that the guest in question was an adult. 17 An appeal to the
Supreme Court of New Jersey followed.
Chief Justice Wilentz, writing for the majority, first acknowledged that in the predominant number of jurisdictions that had
addressed the issue, courts had uniformly declined to extend liability to social hosts. 18 The Chief Justice immediately asserted, however, that such an immunization of hosts did not follow from a
conventional negligence analysis.1 9 Citing Rappaport v. Nichols,20
Chief Justice Wilentz then enunciated the general test of negligence as being whether a reasonably prudent person, within a limited factual situation, would recognize and foresee an unreasonable
risk of harm to others. 21 He continued that the proximate cause
element of negligence was satisfied when the alleged negligent conduct was a "substantial factor" in causing foreseeable injuries.2 2
Focusing next on the principal case and viewing the facts most favorably to the plaintiff, 23 the Chief Justice concluded both that the
Zaks' conduct was negligent in continuing to provide liquor to
Gwinnell past the point of visible intoxication and that a reasonable person in the Zaks' position could foresee the likely consequences of Gwinnell's drunk driving.2 4
Chief Justice Wilentz thus found the elements of a cause of action in negligence to be clearly present: 1) there was conduct on
the part of the Zaks which created an unreasonable risk of harm to
the plaintiff, Ms. Kelly; 2) the unreasonable risk of harm that was
created was clearly foreseeable; and 3) the proximate cause requirement was satisfied because the injuries which resulted were
also foreseeable.2 5 He noted that the sole determination remaining
to be made by the court was whether a social host had a duty to
prevent such a risk from arising.2 6
17. Id.
18. Id. In a footnote, Chief Justice Wilentz cited the Pennsylvania decision of Klein v.
470 A.2d 507 (1983), as being illustrative of the jurisdictions which
Pa. -,
Raysinger, have declined to extend liability to social hosts under similar circumstances. Id. at 542-43
n.2, 476 A.2d at 1221 n.2.
19. 96 N.J. at 543, 476 A.2d at 1221.
20. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
21. 96 N.J. at 543, 476 A.2d at 1221.
22. Id.
23. Id. The Chief Justice noted that the court had to view the facts most favorably to
the plaintiff because her complaint had been dismissed on a motion for summary judgment.

Id.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 543-44, 476 A.2d at 1221-22.
Id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
Id.
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The Chief Justice observed that duty was usually "assumed"
when an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm was created and
injury resulted.27 Citing Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co. 28 and
New Jersey precedent, 9 the Chief Justice declared, however, that
more than assumption was needed to find the existence of a duty
of reasonable care; rather, what was required was a value judgment
based on an analysis of public policy.3 0 Finding that the imposition
of a duty in the instant case was both fair and consistent with
state s" and societal policy, Chief Justice Wilentz listed the following factors as among those being influential in his decision: first,
the fact that thousands of deaths were caused yearly by drunken
drivers; second, that such deaths were increasingly being viewed as
intolerable; third, that liquor licensees were prohibited from serving intoxicated adults; and last, that the reduction of drunk driving represented a unanimously accepted societal goal.2
A survey of prior New Jersey decisions followed with the Chief
Justice observing that the imposition of a duty in the instant case
would extend beyond past holdings."s He concluded, however, that
a trend had emerged from these prior decisions which clearly justified the present expansion of liability.3 4 Moreover, he noted that
this trend had evolved despite the arguments, many of which were
presented in the instant case, that "social" policies dictated that a
social host be invested with immunity. 5
The survey began with the Chief Justice considering Rappaport
27. Id.
28. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
29. 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222. The Chief Justice cited two cases: Goldberg v.
Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962) ("whether a duty exists
is ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of
the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution"); Portee
v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 101, 417 A.2d 521, 528, (1980) (whether liability for negligent infliction
of emotional harm should be expanded depends ultimately on a balancing of the conflicting
interests involved).
30. 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
31. Id. at 544-45, 476 A.2d at 1222. The Chief Justice found support for his conclusion
that the imposition of a duty in the instant case would be consonant with the state policy of
New Jersey by noting the Governor's Annual Message to the New Jersey State Legislature,
January 10, 1984, wherein the Governor stated that criminal sanctions against drunken driving had been significantly strengthened to the point where they were regarded as the
toughest in the nation. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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v. Nichols,36 where it was held that a liquor licensee was liable to
the victim of an automobile accident which was caused by the subsequent drunken driving of a minor customer. 7 Despite the existence of statutes and regulations which prohibited licensees from
serving minors and intoxicated patrons, the Chief Justice expressly
stated that the imposition of the duty in Rappaport was based
upon common law negligence.38
The Chief Justice next cited the Appellate Division's decision in
Linn v. Rand"9 as a significant step in the trend earlier noted.40 In
Linn, a social host was held liable for the consequences of serving
liquor to a visibly intoxicated minor who thereafter injured a third
party in the course of his drunken driving.41 Chief Justice Wilentz
stated that practically all the arguments against finding a social
host liable that were before the court had been presented in
Linn.2 The only feature, according to the court, which distinguished Linn from the instant case was that Linn involved a guest
who was a minor.4
The supreme court, through Chief Justice Wilentz, then expressly approved Linn's extension of liability to social hosts. 44 The
court emphasized that Linn, like Rappaport before it, relied on a
common law duty, rather than on one arising from existing statutes or regulations which, the court conceded, were targeted only
to licensees.' 5 In a corresponding footnote,, the court then expressly
stipulated that while the rationale of Linn was confined to situations where the guest was a minor, this rationale would be equally
36. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
37. 96 N.J. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222-23.
38. 96 N.J. at 546, 476 A.2d at 1223. Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582,
218 A.2d 630 (1966), was then cited by the court to illustrate that the duty of a licensee was
not only owed to the general public, but also to the customer as well. 96 N.J. at 546, 476
A.2d at 1223. The Chief Justice drew attention to the fact that two arguments in the present
case against finding a social host liable had also been presented in Soronen, but did not
prevail. The first argument was that fault rested solely with the "drunk," especially where
that person was an adult. Id. Second was the argument that the social relationships attendant to social drinking should not be intruded upon by the possibilities of litigation. Id.
39. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976).
40. 96 N.J. at 546, 476 A.2d at 1223. See also supra notes 36-40 and accompanying
text.
41. 96 N.J. at 546, 476 A.2d at 1223.
42. Id. The Chief Justice briefly enumerated several of the arguments as including the
"sole fault of the drinker" rationale, the difference between social setting drinking and tavern drinking, and the basic differences between a social host and a licensee. Id.
43. Id. at 547, 476 A.2d at 1223.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 547, 476 A.2d at 1223-24.
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applicable to a situation involving an adult guest.4
Following this survey of cases, the Chief Justice specifically addressed the argument that imposing liability upon a licensee was
justified because a licensee derived a profit from serving liquor, but
that no such justification could be found for a social host. 47 He
rejected this argument and emphasized that the duty of care arose
from the "control of the liquor supply.' 4 He stressed that a provider of liquor had a. fundamental duty to the general public not to
create unreasonable, foreseeable risks, and that such a duty was
not contingent upon the setting where alcohol was provided.4 9
46. Id. at 547 n.7, 476 A.2d at 1224 n.7. In her dissent, Justice Garibaldi also expressly
approved of the decision in Linn because, as she asserted, it was based on the fact that a
minor was involved, and minors had traditionally been protected from the consequences of
their own immaturity by state regulation. Id. at 561 n.1, 476 A.2d at 1230-31 n.1 (Garibaldi,
J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi challenged the majority's interpretation of Linn that the
fact that a minor was involved was not controlling to that decision and she cited two Pennsylvania cases for support. Id. She asserted that Klein v. Raysinger, - Pa. __, 470 A.2d
-507 (1983), and Congini v. Porterville Valve Co., - Pa. -, 470 A.2d 515 (1983) had contrary holdings as to social host liability solely because one case involved a minor and the
other did not. 96 N.J. at 561 n.1, 476 A.2d at 1230-31 n.1 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Referring to the Linn decision, she conceded that it was based on common law negligence, but
she argued that the court, in essence, had relied on the regulations prohibiting service of
alcohol to minors as evidence of legislative intent when it imposed the duty of care upon the
social host. Id. at 561, 476 A.2d at 1230-31.
47. Id. at 547-48, 476 A.2d at 1224.
48. Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
49. Id. A substantial portion of Justice Garibaldi's dissent was spent on the distinction
between a "licensee" and a "social host" with her conclusion being that the imposition of
liability upon the former was entirely justified, whereas a similar imposition upon the latter,
the "average citizen," would be excessively burdensome. Id. at 565-68, 476 A.2d at 1233-35
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Preliminarily, she noted that prior to the instant decision, only
"licensees" had been held liable by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the drunk driving
area. Id. at 560, 476 A.2d at 1230. She then asserted that because of the peculiar position
occupied by a licensee, and because commercial licensees were subject to regulation by the
Alcoholic Beverage Commission (ABC) and the Legislature, it was proper for the courts to
impose liability upon them when they violated explicit statutes or regulations. Id. at 565,
476 A.2d at 1233.
Justice Garibaldi then proceeded with an extensive discussion of the dissimilarities between a social host and a licensee. First, she maintained that a significant difference centered on the average citizen's lack of knowledge and expertise in assessing levels and degrees
of intoxication, whereas licensees were confronted with the problem daily. Id. She criticized
the manner in which the majority claimed that the standard to be used by a host in assessing a guest's drunkenness was simply a subjective one to the extent of a host's knowledge,
while the majority itself had the benefit of objective evidence in reaching its conclusion that
Gwinnell was severely intoxicated. Id. Justice Garibaldi then stressed that whether or not a
person was intoxicated was not a simple issue. Citing as authority medical journals and an
AMA publication, she explained that not only did alcohol effect everyone differently, but
alcohol also took time to enter the bloodstream and outwardly manifest its effects. Id. at
565-66, 476 A.2d at 1233-34. Thus, an elevated blood alcohol level after an accident was not
necessarily conclusive that the individual was "obviously" intoxicated when he left a host's
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After articulating the precise holding of the case,5" Chief Justice
Wilentz maintained that an analysis of the various policy considerations compelled the imposition of a duty on social hosts. He
stated that the added assurance of just compensation to victims of
drunken driving and the additional deterrent effect on drunk driving far outweighed the contrary concerns that accepted standards
of social behavior would be interfered with or that the enjoyment
and camaraderie that accompanied social gatherings would be
diminished."
In support of its holding, the court analogized the imposition of
liability on social hosts to that traditionally imposed on car owners
home. Id.
Justice Garibaldi next added that the nature of home entertaining made this duty even
more burdensome. Id. at 566, 476 A.2d at 1234. Unlike a commercial establishment where
there were controls on the service of liquor by bartenders and waitresses, guests frequently
served themselves or other guests at social gatherings. Id. Further, a social host was usually
so busy entertaining that it was impossible for them to analyze the "drunkenness" of all his
guests. Id. Finally, whereas a commercial bartender did not usually drink on the job, a host
often did drink with his or her guests which thus rendered the host even less able to determine when a guest was intoxicated. Id.
Justice Garibaldi then stated that an even more pressing distinction focused on the host's
inability to comply with the duty imposed even when the host knew that a particular guest
was intoxicated. Id. at 567, 476 A.2d at 1234. It was much easier for a bartender in a detached business relationship to refuse to serve~a patron than it was for a host in a social
setting to do the same thing. Id. She contended that a host's desire to avoid confrontation in
a social setting and the social pressures of informing a boss, client, friend or family member
that they would no longer be served could not be ignored. Id. Finally, a social host did not
have the luxury of a bouncer to prevent difficulties and to enforce the host's desire that the
individual stop drinking or that the individual not drive home. Id.
Finally, Justice Garibaldi articulated what she perceived as the most significant distinction between a social host and a commercial licensee: the social host's inability to spread the
cost of liability. Id. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1234. Whereas a commercial licensee spreads the cost
of procuring liability insurance among his or her customers, a social host must bear the
entire cost of insurance alone. Id.
50. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
51. 96 N.J. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224. In a corresponding footnote, the court acknowledged that its present decision was inconsistent with an Appellate Division holding in Anslinger v. Martinsville, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 525, 298 A.2d 84 (App. Div. 1972), certif. denied, 62 N.J. 334, 301 A.2d 449 (1973). In Anslinger, the court refused to impose liability on
"business" associates for the injuries sustained by a drunken guest after leaving their social
affair. The Chief Justice noted that the Anslinger court also discussed, in dictum, the policy
reasons against imposing liability on "social hosts" or hosts in "quasi-business" settings. 96
N.J. at 548-49 n.8, 476 A.2d at 1224 n.8. Although he observed that Anslinger was factually
distinguishable from the instant case, Chief Justice Wilentz summarily stated that the court
was now persuaded that the policy considerations warranted the imposition of such a duty
on social hosts. Id. He then cited the lower court decision of Figuly v. Knoll, 185 N.J. Super.
477, 449 A.2d 564 (Law. Div. 1982), as a case with facts substantially similar to those of the
instant case where a social host was held liable. 96 N.J. at 548-49 n.8, 476 A.2d at 1224 n.8.
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who lent their cars to persons known to be intoxicated.5 s In terms
of liability to third parties, the court asserted that there was no
difference whether one lent a car to a drunk or whether one continued to provide drinks to an intoxicated individual known to be
thereafter driving."
Chief Justice Wilentz next disputed the dissent's assertion that
the potential liability imposed upon a social host was disproportionate to the fault of that host.5 4 The Chief Justice first questioned the social judgments implied by such an assertion and contended that liability was not disproportionate when a host's
actions, which were relatively easily corrected,' resulted in
debilitating injury and death. 55 He then addressed the parallel argument that a social host's insurance coverage would be insufficient to protect the host.5 The contention was that, while homeowners' insurance covered such liability, there was a risk that the
host and spouse would be jointly liable. To the extent that insurance coverage was inadequate, therefore, the concern was that the
52. Id. at 549, 476 A.2d at 1224-25. The court cited the following cases as being illustrative of the liability that has traditionally been imposed on vehicle owners who lend their
vehicles to intoxicated individuals: Harris v. Smith, 119 Ga. App. 306, 167 S.E.2d 198 (1969);
Deck v. Sherlock, 162 Neb. 86, 75 N.W.2d 99 (1956); Pennington v. Davis-Child Motor Co.,
143 Kan. 753, 57 P.2d 428 (1936); Knight v. Gosselin, 124 Cal. App. 290, 12 P.2d 454 (1932);
Mitchell v. Churches, 119 Wash. 547, 206 P. 6 (1922).
53. 96 N.J. at 549, 476 A.2d at 1224-25.
54. Id. at 549-50, 476 A.2d at 1225.
55. Id. Likewise, when Chief Justice Wilentz later addressed the dissent's contentions
regarding the financial impact on insurance premiums for the homeowner and the alleged
alterations in social behavior that would result from the majority's holding, he stressed that
these concerns had to be weighed against the "misery, death, and destruction caused by the
drunken driver." Id. at 557-58, 476 A.2d at 1229. In the course of his discussion, Chief Justice Wilentz questioned how, despite the knowledge that nearly one-half of all automobile
deaths were caused by drunk drivers, there could even be a concern about disturbing the
social customs of those who provided the liquor, or about the additional costs that they
would have to bear. Id. He concluded that the dissent's analysis was distorted in that it
treated the social host as the victim rather than as the "cause of the carnage." Id.
56. Id. at 549-50, 476 A.2d at 1225. In a corresponding footnote, Chief Justice Wilentz
found unpersuasive the dissent's contention that even if a typical homeowner's policy would
cover such liability, the homeowner/social host would be unable to "spread the cost of liability" in contrast with a commercial licensee who spreads the cost-among his customers. Id. at
550 n.9, 476 A.2d at 1225 n.9. The Chief Justice stated that the critical issue was not
whether the homeowner could pass the cost on or had to bear it himself, but rather
"whether tort law should be used to spread the risk over a large segment of society through
the device of insurance rather than imposing the entire risk on the innocent victim of
drunken driving." Id. He concluded that there probably would be some additional increase
in insurance premiums, but the fact that a homeowner was unable to pass that cost onto
others was "no more persuasive than that same argument would be as to the 'average citizen's automobile liability insurance or, for that matter, for homeowners' insurance as it now
exists." Id.
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host and spouse would lose their home.5 7 Notwithstanding the arguments made, however, Chief Justice Wilentz concluded that the
loss of a home by negligent individuals causing the injury was not
disproportionate to the loss of a life by one totally innocent of any
wrongdoing.
Noting the lack of precedent elsewhere in the country, the court
then held that the imposition of liability on social hosts would be
applied only prospectively.59 He noted, however, that the parties to
the present action would be bound by the decision. 60
Next, Chief Justice Wilentz revealed the underlying purpose behind the court's decision-namely, the fair compensation of innocent victims of drunken driving. 6 ' While it was hoped that the
holding would also tend to deter drunken driving, the fact that
there was no assurance that such a result would occur did not
emasculate the decision. 2 The Chief Justice concluded by expressing the belief of the majority that its holding would result in more
vigilant social hosts who sought not only to avoid the moral responsibility, but also the potential legal and economic liability
which followed from its decision. 3
Chief Justice Wilentz then refuted another of the dissent's contentions: namely, that the issue before the court was one appropriate solely for legislative resolution. 4 The Chief Justice noted that
57. Id. at 549-50, 476 A.2d at 1225. After conceding that it was common for both
spouses to be liable in automobile accident cases, the Chief Justice noted that some special
form of insurance protecting the spouses' equity in their home might have to be developed.
Id.
58, Id. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Garibaldi alluded to her legislative competence argument and contended that when the, possibility was considered that a social host
could lose everything if found liable, the duty imposed by the majority could only be justified after an in-depth weighing of the individual cost to each citizen. Id. at 568, 476 A.2d at
1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 551, 476 A.2d at 1225. Such a holding was regarded as fair by the Chief
Justice for it allowed social host/homeowners the opportunity to increase their insurance
coverage. Id.
60. Id. at 551, 476 A.2d at 1225-26. The Chief Justice stated that to do otherwise
would deprive the plaintiff of any benefit which resulted from her efforts, and would also
make it less likely that individuals in the future would pursue rights that they believed to
have been violated simply because they were not yet established. Id.
61. Id. at 551-52, 476 A.2d at 1226.
62. Id. Alluding to the delayed effects of the criminal law sanctions upon drunk driving, the court stated that it was not necessary to condition the imposition of the duty upon
scientific proof that one of its goals would be accomplished. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 552, 476 A.2d at 1226. Later in the opinion, Chief Justice Wilentz conceded
that more could be learned through a legislative investigation, but then skeptically asked
whether it was necessary for the court to know more. Id. at 558, 476 A.2d at 1229. He con-
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it had traditionally been a function of the judiciary to prescribe
the existence and scope of duties in negligence." He continued
that this was particularly the case in New Jersey with respect to
drunk driving because there was no dram shop act from which to
obtain guidance."O Further, the Chief Justice deemed it significant
that despite the supreme court's initial imposition of liability on
licensees in 1959,67 and all the subsequent expansions of that liability which had occurred up to the present time, he knew of no
legislative pronouncements criticizing judicial involvement as inappropriate.6a In fact, the Chief Justice stated that the judicial decisions in New Jersey were consonant with the strong legislative policy against drunken driving, and he cited the Linn case as an
example.6 In Linn, liability was extended for the first time to a
social host who had served a minor.7 0 Instead of an adverse reaction on the part of the legislature, it passed S.1054 which imposed
criminal sanctions on anyone who knowingly served liquor to a minor. 71 The Chief Justice contended that this action indicated the
7
legislature's approval of the decision in Linn. 1
The Chief Justice then identified two related grounds upon
which the dissent relied in concluding that the matter should be
resolved by the legislature: the first involved the legislature's superior ability to obtain knowledge and information in order to better
balance the interests involved in arriving at an appropriate remedy, and the second concerned the potential "extraordinary" effects that the majority's decision would have on the average citizen.7 In his analysis of these grounds, the Chief Justice first stated
that the majority of the cases cited by the dissent were from jurisdictions in which a dram shop act was in effect, and therefore, were
cluded on this point that it was obvious that drunken drivers were causing substantial personal and financial destruction in New Jersey, and that many of these drivers were drinking
in the homes as well as the taverns. Id.
65. Id. at 552, 476 A.2d at 1226.
66. Id.
67. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
68. 96 N.J. at 553, 476 A.2d at 1226.
69. See Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976).
70. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
71. 96 N.J. at 547 n.6, 476 A.2d at 1223 n.6.
72. Id. at 553, 476 A.2d at 1226. In her dissent, Justice Garibaldi interpreted S.1054 in
a drastically different manner. Id. at 569, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). She
stated that while this bill imposed a criminal penalty on social hosts who served alcohol to
minors, the absence of any legislation imposing similar liability on social hosts who served
adult guests was indicative of the legislative intent on the matter. Id.
73. Id. at 553, 476 A.2d at 1227.
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clearly distinguishable.7 4 The Chief Justice explained that, whether
or not it was explicitly expressed in the opinions, the very existence of a dram shop act represented a substantial argument
against expanding legislatively-prescribed liability.75 Simply stated,
the argument advanced by the court was that when a legislature,
after specifically considering the drunk driving area, chose to
render only licensees liable, this represented strong evidence that
the legislature did not intend to impose the same liability upon
social hosts."0 It was then noted that of all the cases cited by the
dissent holding that a social host should not be liable, only four
were from jurisdictions in which there was no dram shop act.77
Turning to the allegation that the court's ruling would have an
"extraordinary" impact on the average citizen in terms of the citizen's social or business environment, Chief Justice Wilentz expressed the court's belief that extraordinary change was already
taking place in society with regard to a host's monitoring of a
guest's drinking.78 He then declared that based on the court's firm
belief that insurance was available to social hosts, that compensation of innocent victims was a desirable goal, and that the added
deterrence against drunk driving was salutary, the potential alteration in "cocktail-party" customs did not constitute a significant
enough threat to the social well-being to preclude the court from
acting. 9
74. Id. Chief Justice Wilentz listed the following cases as being cited by the dissent to
support the contention that the matter should be resolved by the legislature: Kowal v.
Hofher, 181 Conn. 355, 436 A.2d 1 (1980); Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d
1046 (1981); Behnke v. Pierson, 21 Mich. App. 219, 175 N.W.2d 303 (1970); Cole v. City of
Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982); Shirmer v. Yost, 60 A.D.2d 789, 400
N.Y.S.2d 655 (1977); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1975), aff'd mem.,
55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976). Id.
75. 96 N.J. at 554, 476 A.2d at 1227.
76. Id.
77. Id. The cases cited by the Chief Justice for this proposition were: Cartwright v.
Hyatt Corp., 460 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1978); Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145
(1979); Klein v. Raysinger, - Pa. -, 470 A.2d 507 (1983); Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237,
310 A.2d 75 (1973); Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897
(1969).
78. 96 N.J. at 554-55, 476 A.2d at 1227.
79. Id. Chief Justice Wilentz later returned to the dissent's concern over the "extraordinary" impact that the majority's decision would have on the average citizen. Id. at
556-57, 476 A.2d at 1228-29. He added that the fears of the dissent resembled those which
had been asserted in opposition to the supreme court's abolishing of husband-wife, parentchild, and general family immunity. Id. To illustrate this, Justice Wilentz cited Immer v.
Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970), and France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500,
267 A.2d 490 (1970). He noted that in Immer, the proponents of interspousal immunity
claimed both that domestic harmony would be disrupted and that fraud and collusion
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The Chief Justice concluded this matter by contending that the
supreme court had decided many significant issues in the past
without any legislative input being available for guidance."0 Further, he asserted that it was well-established that when it disapproved of a particular judicial resolution, the legislature always
had a remedy.8 1
After restating that the judiciary was competent to decide the
present issue, Chief Justice Wilentz announced that, in light of the
precedents in New Jersey, the decision rendered by the supreme
court was a significant, yet fairly predictable, expansion of liability
in the area of drunk driving." In a corresponding footnote, he once
again made reference to the Linn decision.' The Chief Justice argued that the entire thrust of the Linn decision was to provide
compensation to an innocent victim of a drunken driver.8 4 He
maintained that the rationale of the Linn decision centered on
that court's belief that there was no compelling reason to impose
liability on licensees and not on social hosts.8 5 The Chief Justice
concluded that there was not the slightest indication in Linn that
its underlying purpose was to protect minors.8 6 The Chief Justice next alleged that the dissent's difficulties with
the majority opinion were purely hypothetical, and he then reiterated the express holding in the case. s8 He did so in order to set out
those situations not covered by the Kelly decision. Specifically,
Justice Wilentz stated that the decision did not cover a party situagainst insurance companies would be encouraged if the immunity was abandoned. Further,
he noted that in France, it was argued that the refusal to apply the parent-child immunity
would interfere with parental care, discipline and control. Id. The Chief Justice then found
support for his conviction that the dissent's fears in the instant case were unsubstantiated
by summarily observing that only beneficial results had stemmed from the immunity decisions. 96 N.J. at 554-55, 476 A.2d at 1227.
80. 96 N.J. at 555, 476 A.2d at 1227-28.
81. Id. Chief Justice Wilentz then listed numerous examples where a New Jersey judicial holding was subsequently abrogated by a legislative enactment. See, e.g., Willis v. Department of Conservation and Economic Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970) (abolishing
the state's sovereign immunity from tort claims), and compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-1-59:17 (reestablishing and defining immunity for all New Jersey governmental bodies).
82. 96 N.J. at 555-56, 476 A.2d at 1228.
83. See supra notes 72-73. He then commented that the dissent's approval of the Linn
decision was difficult to understand because Linn differed only slightly in degree from the
instant case. 96 N.J. at 556 n.14, 476 A.2d at 1228 n.14. He refuted the dissent's notion that
Linn was distinguishable because it involved minors who traditionally were protected from
their own immaturity by state regulation. Id.
84. Id. at 556 n.14, 476 A.2d at 1228 n.14.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228.
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ation where guests had congregated, nor did it cover situations
where guests were serving each other, where the host was too busy
to monitor the drinking, or where the host was himself drunk.8 8
The Chief Justice then again acknowledged that the dissent expressed a view which was in accord with the view of practically
every other jurisdiction that had addressed the issue.8 9 He remained convinced, however, that the devastating consequences of
drunk driving outweighed all the contrary concerns expressed in
those jurisdictions.9" Drunk driving was a problem that society was
just beginning to understand, and Chief Justice Wilentz observed
that New Jersey simply had the foresight to do so sooner than
others.9 1
The Chief Justice revealed in conclusion the court had sensed a
substantial change occurring in social attitudes and customs concerning drinking, and, given this change, the court's decision was
in step with the movement to stop "the senseless loss inflicted by
'92
drunken drivers.
Finally, Chief Justice Wilentz stated that the court's ruling
would not result in a deluge of lawsuits because of the limited
scope of the decision. The two primary limiting factors were that
the holding applied only to the situation where a host directly
served a guest, and also that liability was imposed solely for injuries which resulted from the guest's drunken driving.9
The court then reversed the lower court judgment in favor of the
Zaks, and remanded the case to the Law Division for proceedings
88. Id. Chief Justice Wilentz stated that liability in instances such as these would be
decided when and if the situations arose. Id. Noting the majority's contention that its holding was a limited one and that her fears were purely hypothetical, Justice Garibaldi in her
dissent argued that it was unrealistic to assume that the standards established by the majority would not eventually be applied to hosts in other social situations. Id. at 567, 476 A.2d at
1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). In her view, the door to speculative and subjective impositions of liability had now been opened. Id.
89. Id. at 557, 476 A.2d at 1229. In her dissent, Justice Garibaldi asserted that despite
the fact that many other jurisdictions had addressed the same issue as was before the court,
no decision was currently in force which extended liability to a social host who had provided
liquor to an adult guest. Id. at 561, 476 A.2d at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). She further
maintained that any judicial attempts to establish such liability had been invalidated or
revoked by subsequent legislative action. Id.
90. Id. at 557, 476 A.2d at 1229.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 558-59, 476 A.2d at 1229.
93. Id. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230. The Chief Justice further stated that no abundance of
fraudulent claims would arise because of the thorough investigations conducted by law enforcement officers as to the cause of all such accidents. Id.

1320

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:1307

consistent with the opinion."e
In her dissenting opinion,95 Justice Garibaldi severely criticized
the majority holding as placing an unduly onerous burden on every
New Jersey citizen who "poured a drink."9 6 She contended that
the average citizen now had a duty to correctly assess an adult
guest's level of intoxication at
the risk of being financially liable
9 7
beyond his or her resources.
Justice Garibaldi stressed that her position as a strong advocate
in combating drunk driving was well established, but because of
the limitless implications of the majority's holding, she was compelled to conclude that the court was not competent to impose
such a duty upon social hosts. 8 Rather, in her view, it was the
legislature which was best equipped to not only effectuate the goals
of reducing drunk driving tragedies and compensating innocent
victims, but also to accomplish those goals without placing as grave
a burden on the average New Jersey citizen as had been done by
the majority holding.9
It is essential to an understanding of the ramifications of the
Kelly decision to immediately identify the three most significant
aspects of the case. First and foremost, within the broad spectrum
of third party liability for the consequences of drunk driving, Kelly
addressed solely the liability of a social host; second, the principal
tortfeasor involved was an adult guest of the social host; and third,
the theory of liability was purportedly based entirely on common
law negligence principles. 10 0 The recognition of these elements is
necessary to properly define the scope of Kelly, and to facilitate an
analysis of the decision from both a doctrinal and policy
standpoint.
No tort cause of action was recognized at the common law
against one who furnished intoxicating liquor, either by sale or by
94. Id. at 560, 476 A.2d at 1230.
95. Id. (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Justice Garibaldi cited a series of state court decisions to illustrate the point that
the imposition of liability upon social hosts had such an extraordinary effect on the average
citizen that the issue of liability was best left for legislative resolution. See supra notes 7679 and accompanying text. She substantiated this contention by quoting demonstrative language from many of the state court decisions initially cited. 96 N.J. at 562-63, 476 A.2d at
1231-32 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
100. For a thorough general discussion of the broad spectrum of third party liability
for the torts of drunk drivers, see Comment, Third Party Liability For Drunken Driving:
When "One For The Road" Becomes One For The Courts, 29 VIL. L. REV. 1119 (1983-84).
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gift, to a person who thereafter became intoxicated and injured the
person or property of a third party. 10 1 The rationale behind this
common law rule of non-liability centered on the notion that it was
the consumption of alcohol by an able-bodied person, rather than
the furnishing of that alcohol, which was the proximate cause of
the drinker's intoxication and the resultant injury.'0 Underlying
this rule was the moral judgment that the intoxicated tortfeasor
himself should bear the consequences of his over-indulgence. 0 3
Due to the escalating incidence of highway fatalities which has
resulted from the mixing of a motorized society with intoxicating
liquors, 04 courts have begun to reexamine the traditional common
law view. Increasingly, the social host has been the subject of that
reexamination. As a result, in an effort to deter drunk driving and
to compensate innocent victims, courts have utilized three legal
101. See, e.g., Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889), where the court noted
that
it was not a tort at common law to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to "a strong
and able-bodied man," and it can be said safely that it is not anywhere laid down in
the books that such act was ever held at common law to be culpable negligence, that
would impose legal liability for damages upon the vendor or donor of such liquor.
Id. at 234, 20 N.E. at 74. See generally 45 Am. Ju 2D Intoxicating Liquors §§ 553-54 (1969)
and cases cited therein.
102. Specifically, the consumption of alcohol would be considered the superseding intervening cause of the drinker's intoxication; the furnishing of alcohol would be deemed an
act too remote to be the proximate cause of either the drinker's intoxication or the resultant
injuries. See, e.g., State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951), where the
Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that:
Apart from statute, the common law knows no right of action against a seller of
intoxicating liquors . . . for "causing" intoxication of the person whose negligent or
willful wrong has caused injury. Human beings, drunk or sober, are responsible for
their own torts. The law (apart from statute) recognizes no relation of proximate
cause between a sale of liquor and a tort committed by a buyer who has drunk the
liquor.
Id. at 254, 78 A.2d at 756.
103. Simply stated, this moral judgment was based on the argument that one cannot
become intoxicated by liquor furnished to him unless he consumes it, and therefore, the
consumer should bear the consequences of his indulgence. See, e.g., Nolan v. Morelli, 154
Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383 (1967); State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754
(1951).
104. THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 1, cited in
TRIAL, March 1985, found that:
At least 50 percent of all highway deaths involve the irresponsible use of alcohol.
Over the past 10 years, 250,000 Americans have tragically lost their lives in alcoholrelated crashes. Conservative estimates place the annual economic loss at $21 billion,
while others run as high as $24 billion . . . . In single-vehicle fatal crashes . . .
upwards of 65 percent of those drivers who died were legally under the influence, i.e.,
their alcohol level was 0.10.
Id. at 45.
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theories to abrogate the common law rule of non-liability in the
attempt to impose civil liability on the social purveyor of alcohol.
Several courts have established liability by interpreting broadly
worded "dram shop acts" to include social hosts.10 5 Other courts
have used violations of alcoholic beverage control statutes to impose liability upon the social host.10 6 Lastly, and in contrast to
these statutory approaches, certain courts have applied traditional
common law negligence principles in order to hold a social host
10 7
civilly accountable.
Under the first theory of liability, plaintiffs have attempted to
have broadly worded dram shop or civil liability acts construed to
include social hosts within their purview.10 8 These acts typically
impose strict liability upon any person who furnishes alcoholic
beverages when the consumer of the beverages becomes intoxicated
and subsequently injures some third party.'0 9 Despite this broad
and seemingly dispositive language, most courts have uniformly refused to hold social hosts liable under such a theory, reasoning
that dram shop acts were intended for, and should only be applied
105. For a discussion of social host liability under the theory of extending "dram
shop" acts, see infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
106. For a discussion of social host liability under the theory of alcoholic beverage
control act violations, see infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
107. For a discussion of social host liability under the theory of common law negligence, see infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300
(1964) (dram .shop act inapplicable where social host/employer unlawfully served a minor
employee); Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889) (dram shop act inapplicable where
social host gratuitously provided drinks for a friend); Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314
N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982) (dram shop act inapplicable to social host); Kohler v. Wray, 114
Misc. 2d 856, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (dram shop act inapplicable to a social host
in a non-commercial setting). But see Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972)
(dram shop liability imposed on social host who purchased liquor for minor); Ross v. Ross,
294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972) (dram shop liability imposed on social host who
purchased alcohol for minor).
109. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) at 444 defines "Dram Shop Acts" in pertinent part as follows:
Many states have Dram Shop or Civil Liability Acts which impose liability on the
seller of intoxicating liquors . . . when a third party is injured as a result of the intoxication of the buyer where the sale has caused or contributed to such intoxication.
Some acts apply to gifts as well as sales. Such acts protect the third party. . . against
injuries resulting directly from affirmative acts of the intoxicated man, such as resulting from negligent operation of vehicle . ...
Dean Prosser describes a dram shop act as one "impos[ing] strict liability, without negligence, upon the seller of intoxicating liquor, when the sale results in harm to the interests of
a third person because of the intoxication of the buyer." PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 81, at 581 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984). See also McGough, Dramshop Acts, PROCEEDINGS OF A.B.A. SECTION OF INS., NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. 448 (1966-67).
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to, commercial licensees who are in the business of selling liquor.11 0
Where there have been aberrations from this general rule and
courts have recognized social host liability based upon violation of
a dram shop act, 1 ' these decisions have been effectively overruled
by the respective state legislatures through subsequent amend2
ments to their dram shop acts."1
The second theory utilized by courts to impose civil liability
upon a social host for injuries caused by an intoxicated guest is
based upon violations of alcoholic beverage control acts."' The
majority of these statutes characteristically make it unlawful for
any person to sell or furnish alcoholic beverages to high risk persons-minors or those who are obviously intoxicated." 4 Violations
of these statutes generally constitute criminal misdemeanor offenses." ' Several courts, however, have construed these statutes as
110. See supra note 108. See also LeGault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 643, 152
N.W.2d 712, 713 (1967) ("It is not the law that private individuals are liable for the actions
of their social guests who over-indulge in the liquid hospitality provided at private homes or
parties."); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (court refused
to extend liability to social hosts where the New York Dram Act had been held to apply
only to commercial providers of alcohol), aff'd mem., 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631
(1976).
111. See Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972) (dram shop liability imposed on social host who purchased liquor for minor); Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200
N.W.2d 149 (1972) (dram shop liability imposed on social host who purchased alcohol for
minor).
112. See supra note 111. The dram shop act involved in Ross was amended by removal of the word "giving," thereby making it clear that the statute applied only to the
seller of alcoholic beverages. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984). The dram
shop act construed in Williams was subsequently amended to limit recovery to instances
involving the sale or giving of alcohol by "licensees" or "permittees." See IOWA CODE ANN. §
123.92 (West Supp. 1984).
113. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted alcoholic beverage control statutes which regulate the sale and distribution of alcohol to high risk persons. For a
listing of the statutes, see Comment, supra note 100, at 1137 n.84.
114. See, e.g., 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-493(1) (Purdon 1969), wherein it is
provided:
It shall be unlawful-(1) For any licensee. . .or any other person, to sell, furnish or
give any liquor or malt or brewed beverages . . . to any person visibly intoxicated, or
to any insane person, or to any minor, or to habitual drunkards, or persons of known
intemperate habits.
115. See, e.g., 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-494(a) (Purdon 1969), where it is provided
that:
Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this article . . . shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of
not less than one hundred dollars ($100), nor more than five hundred dollars ($500),
and on failure to pay such fine, to imprisonment for not less than one month, nor
more than three months . . ..
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creating a minimum, statutorily imposed standard of care. 1 6 Once
the courts have acknowledged the existence of this statutory standard of care, they have held that the violation of an alcoholic beverage control statute was evidence of negligence 1 7 or negligence
per se." 8
A survey of the cases reveals, however, that in the overwhelming
majority of instances where this theory of liability has been involved, a social host has successfully been held liable only where
the host served a minor." 9 In fact, the only court to find a social
host liable for serving an adult in violation of a beverage control
act had its decision subsequently mooted by legislative
amendment. 2 0
Finally, the application of traditional common law negligence
principles comprises the third theory upon which social furnishers
116. Prosser and Keeton explain the use of criminal statutes to impose civil liability as
follows:
[T]he courts are seeking, by something in the nature of judicial legislation, to further
the ultimate policy for the protection of individuals which they find underlying the
statute, and which they believe the legislature must have had in mind. The statutory
standard of conduct is simply adopted voluntarily, out of deference and respect for
the legislature.
PROSSER, supra note 111, § 36, at 222 (footnotes omitted).
117. The following cases subscribe to the theory that violations of alcoholic beverage
control acts are evidence of negligence: Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d
669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978); Longstreth v. Fitzgibbon, 125 Mich. App. 261, 335 N.W.2d
677 (1983); Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975); Soronen v.
Olde Milford Inn, 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156
A.2d 1 (1959).
118. The following cases subscribe to the alternate theory that violations of alcoholic
beverage control acts are "negligence per se" with the issue of negligent conduct being foreclosed from consideration by the trier of fact: Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 756 (D.
Alaska 1973); Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974); Congini v. PorPa. __, 470 A.2d 517 (1983); Garcia v. Hargrove, 52 Wis. 2d 289, 190
terville Valve Co., N.W.2d 181 (1971).
119. See, e.g., Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974) (furnishing alcohol to minor in violation of alcoholic beverage control statutes constituted "negligence per se"); Longstreth v. Fitzgibbon, 125 Mich. App. 261, 335 N.W.2d 677 (1983) (unlawfully furnishing alcohol to minor in violation of statute was evidence of negligence).
120. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534
(1978). In Coulter, defendant/social hosts served alcoholic beverages to an "obviously intoxicated" person in violation of the California beverage control act. Id. at 148-49, 577 P.2d at
671-72, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536-37. The California Supreme Court held that the statute could
be used as a basis to hold social hosts civilly liable. Id. at 152, 577 P.2d at 673-74, 145 Cal.
Rptr. at 538-39. In the same year, the California legislature amended its statutes to expressly overrule the Coulter holding. The new amendments make it clear that no social host
can be held liable for furnishing intoxicating liquors to one who subsequently injures a third
person. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(a)(b) and (c) (West Supp. 1984); CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1714(b) and (c) (West Supp. 1984).
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of liquor have been held liable.12 ' Several courts have concluded
that it is not unreasonable to hold a social host liable when that
host has created a foreseeable risk of serious harm to innocent
third parties. 12 2 Specifically, these courts have held that the elements of common, law negligence are satisfied when a social host
has furnished alcohol to a minor or an obviously intoxicated adult
with the knowledge that the guest would thereafter be operating a
motor vehicle on the highways. 2 "
121. Despite the direct conflict with the historical common law view of nonliability for
social purveyors of alcohol, the decisions of the various courts in this area have expressed
the view that the historical common law rule was no longer consistent with generally accepted tort theory today. See, e.g., Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458
P.2d 897 (1969) wherein it is stated:
[M]ost courts, at common law, . . . held that the provision of alcohol was not the
proximate cause of injury. Such reasoning is far more persuasive when a drunkard is
annoying or assaulting a passerby, riding a horse, or driving his carriage through the
village street at the breathtaking speed of 10 to 15 miles per hour, than when an
inebriate is in incompetent control of a two-ton metal juggernaut powered by three
hundred horsepower.
Id. at 767, 458 P.2d at 901-02 (Finley, J., dissenting). See also Vance v. United States, 335
F. Supp. 756, 761 (D. Alaska 1973) ("The modern view, and probably the majority view, ...
is that the furnishing of intoxicants may be the proximate cause of the injuries.") Id. For a
discussion of the historical common law rule, see supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
122. Prior to the Kelly decision, only two other jurisdictions advocated this view: California, with the decision in Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534 (1978), and Oregon, with its supreme court decision in Wiener v. Gamma Phi
Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
123. The case generally recognized as embodying the theory of common law negligence
for social hosts is the decision in Wiener, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971). In Wiener, a
fraternity party was organized ten miles from campus with alcoholic beverages being provided. Id. at 636, 485 P.2d at 20. A minor, who had driven to the party, became intoxicated
and was involved in an accident on his way home, injuring his passengers. Id. at 637, 485
P.2d at 20. The passengers filed suit, alleging both that the fraternity was negligent in allowing a minor to become intoxicated at the party and in allowing him to drive back to
campus in his inebriated condition. Id. at 637, 485 P.2d at 20-21. The Oregon Supreme
Court concluded that a jury might properly find that the fraternity's serving of the minor
was unreasonable under these circumstances and therefore held that a valid cause of action
under common law tort principles had been stated against the fraternity. Id.at 643, 485 P.2d
at 23. In so holding, the court also stated that:
Ordinarily, a host who makes available intoxicating liquors to an adult guest is not
liable for injuries to third persons resulting from the guest's intoxication. There
might be circumstances in which the host would have a duty to deny his guest further
access to alcohol. This would be the case where the host "has reason to know that he
is dealing with persons whose characteristics make it especially likely that they will
do unreasonable things." Such persons could include those already severely intoxicated, or those whose behavior the host knows to be unusually affected by alcohol.
Also included might be young people, if their ages were such that they could be expected, by virtue of their youth alone or in connection with other circumstances, to
behave in a dangerous fashion under the influence of alcohol.
We think that each case must be decided on its own facts, and we reject the rules
suggested by the defendants that furnishing alcohol to others in a social setting, even
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Although several courts have imposed liability upon a social host
under negligence principles, these courts are in a definite minority. 24 The principal cases espousing this theory have been either
expressly overruled12 5 or limited by the respective state legislatures. 121 Most courts have refused to extend liability to a social
if the host acts unreasonably, can never give rise to liability for acts of the guest
whose intoxication results.
Id. at 639-40, 485 P.2d at 21-22.
In Coulter, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978), the California Supreme Court took a similar view regarding the availability of a cause of action under traditional negligence principles. The defendant/apartment complex in Coulter hosted a party
for its tenants. Id. at 147-48, 577 P.2d at 670-71, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 535-36. It was alleged that
a tenant was served extremely large quantities of alcohol and that the defendants knew, or
should have known, that the tenant was excessively intoxicated. Id. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant knew of the driver's intention to drive. Id. Nevertheless, the drinking tenant drove from the party with the plaintiff as his passenger and was involved in an
accident.
After approving of civil liability based upon a violation of the alcoholic beverage control
act, the court also addressed liability under common law negligence principles. Id. at 152,
577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536. When it did so, the court found that:
Wholly apart from the provisions of the criminal law, imposition of civil liability in
the present case is fully compatible with general negligence principles . . . . We think
it evident that the service of alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person
by one who knows that such intoxicated person intends to drive a motor vehicle creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to those on the highway . . . . Simply
put, one who serves alcoholic beverages under such circumstances fails to exercise
reasonable care.
Id. at 152-53, 577 P.2d at 673-74, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538-39 (emphasis in original).
124. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
125. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. 534 (1978)
(expressly overruled by legislative amendments to CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West
Supp. 1984); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1984). These amendments expressly stipulate that no social host will be held liable for furnishing intoxicating liquors to one who
becomes intoxicated and subsequently injures a third party. See also supra, note 120,
wherein the specific subsections amended are cited.
126. See Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632,
485 P.2d 18 (1971). In 1979, the Oregon legislature limited the holding in Wiener by statutorily defining the specific situations that give rise to social host liability. The legislation is
considered a limitation because, even though the Wiener court itself noted that its holding
was limited to situations in which a social host breached his duty to refuse service to minors
or to obviously intoxicated individuals, the court also stated that liability had to be determined on a case-by-case basis with each case being decided on its own facts. Id. at 639-40,
485 P.2d at 21. This latter statement left the possibility open that a social host could be
found liable in situations other than those specified by the court. Such a possibility was
then foreclosed when the legislature definitively defined those instances where social host
liability could arise.
The specific legislation enacted was OR. REv. STAT. §§ 30.955, .960 (1979). Section 30.955
provides that "[n]o private host is liable for damages incurred or caused by an intoxicated
social guest unless the private host has served or provided alcoholic beverages to a social
guest when such guest was visibly intoxicated." Id. § 30.955. Section 30.960 provides:
[n]o. . . social host shall be liable to third persons injured by or through persons not
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host under common law negligence principles, reasoning that such
an extension of liability was solely within the province of the

legislature. 127
Kelly v. Gwinnell was resolved under the common law approach.
Although the imposition of social host liability for the acts of an
adult guest represented a significant new development in New
Jersey, an examination of the precedent upon which the Kelly
court based its decision reveals that the outcome was neither doctrinally inconsistent nor particularly surprising.
The Kelly court relied substantially upon the 1959 New Jersey
Supreme Court decision in Rappaportv. Nichols.' In Rappaport,
the court held that a licensee/tavern owner who sold alcoholic beverages to a minor was liable for the death of a person resulting
from the minor's drunken driving.'" 9 In reaching this conclusion,
the court employed a dual theory of liability. First, the Rappaport
court noted that the defendant had violated the New Jersey Alcoholic Beverage Control Act which prohibited the serving of minors
and intoxicated persons.' 3 0 From this, the court reasoned that
"these broadly expressed [statutory] restrictions were not narrowly
intended to benefit the minors and intoxicated persons alone but
were wisely intended for the protection of members of the general
public as well. '"13 The court then stated that the beverage control
act provided a minimum statutory standard of care for the licensee, and that its violation constituted evidence of negligence.' 2
having reached 21 years of age who obtained alcoholic beverages from the licensee,
permittee or social host unless it is demonstrated that a reasonable person would
have determined that identification should have been requested or that the identification exhibited was altered or did not accurately describe the person to whom the
alcoholic liquor was sold or served.
Id. § 30.960.
127. The following cases are illustrative of the view that no common law negligence
action may be brought against a social host who serves a minor or an intoxicated adult:
Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp., 460 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1978); Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91,
589 P.2d 145 (1979); Klein v. Raysinger, Pa. __, 470 A.2d 507 (1983); Halvorson v.
Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969).
128. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
129. Id. at 201, 156 A.2d at 9.
130. Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 9. In holding that a violation of the statute or regulation
was evidence of negligence, the Rappaport court noted that the plaintiff could introduce
additional evidence that the licensee knew or should have known that the patron was a
minor or was intoxicated when served. Id.at 203, 156 A.2d at 9. Conversely, the court also
noted that the licensee could claim that it "did not know or have reason to believe that its
patron was a minor, or intoxicated when served, and that it acted as a reasonably prudent
person would have acted at the time and under the circumstances." Id.
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In terms of its precedential value to the Kelly decision, the second theory of liability utilized by the Rappaport court was of
greater significance. Exclusive of its discussion of the defendant's
violation of the alcoholic beverage control act-and thus the
breach of a statutory standard of care-the court recited the traditional common law test of negligence as being whether a reasonably prudent person, within a limited factual situation, would recognize and foresee an unreasonable risk of harm to another.'3 3 The
court proceeded to state that "[w]here a tavern keeper sells alcoholic beverages to a person who is visibly intoxicated or to a person
he knows or should know from the circumstances to be a minor, he
ought to recognize and foresee the unreasonable risk of harm to
others" which arises in light of the potential actions of that intoxicated person or minor. 34 As a result, the Rappaport court concluded that the licensee's "service to [a minor or an intoxicated
person] may also constitute common law negligence.' 13 5
Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc. was cited by the Kelly court
primarily as a reaffirmation of the principles set forth in Rappaport seven years earlier. 36 Though Soronen was distinguishable
from Rappaport because it involved the claim of a customer rather
than an innocent third .party, the court held that, in addition to
there being a beverage control act violation, the tavern operators
subjected themselves to pure common law negligence claims for all
injuries proximately resulting from the wrongful service to an in137
toxicated patron.
A refinement in the focus of Kelly's rationale can be seen with
the court's discussion of the 1976 superior court decision in Linn v.
Rand, which is described by the supreme court as being a significant precedential step toward the holding in Kelly.1 38 Linn acquired its significance primarily from the fact that the claim in
question was brought against a social host.13 9 Specifically, a per133. Id. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 9. Although historically the proximate cause requirement
had proven fatal to a plaintiff's suit under common law negligence principles, the Rappaport court observed that a tortfeasor should be held answerable for injuries if his negligent conduct was a "substantial factor" in causing those injuries. Id. at 204, 156 A.2d at 9.
For a discussion of the traditional rule that the "consumption" rather than the "furnishing"
was the proximate cause of the injuries resulting from the intoxication, see supra note 102
and accompanying text.
136. 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
137. Id. at 586-87, 218 A.2d at 633.
138. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976).
139. Id. at 214, 356 A.2d at 16.
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sonal injury suit was instituted against a social host alleging that
the host negligently allowed a minor to become intoxicated in the
host's home and then allowed that minor to operate a motor
vehicle.""
The Linn court, as had Soronen before it, focused its analysis on
the "forward-looking and far-reaching philosophy expressed in

Rappaport ....

"141

After quoting with approval the Rappaport

court's definition of actionable negligence, the Linn court went on
to state that "it makes little sense to say that the licensee in Rappaport is under a duty to exercise care, [and then] give immunity
to a social host who may be guilty of the same wrongful conduct
merely because he is unlicensed." '4 2
Turning to the facts before it, the superior court in Linn stated
that all such claims must be decided on a case by case basis. 143 The
court then held that a social host who served excessive amounts of
alcohol to a visibly intoxicated minor, knowing that the minor
guest would thereafter be driving, could reasonably foresee an accident or injury. As a consequence of this negligence in serving the
minor, therefore, the social host would be liable.' 44
In addition to Linn, the Kelly court alluded in a footnote to a
second superior court decision and characterized it as a case with
facts substantially similar to those that were before the court."'4 In
Figuly v. Knoll,146 the pertinent facts consisted of a claim against a
social host for negligently serving an adult guest who thereafter
caused injury to another while operating a motor vehicle. 1'4 The
Figuly court summarily traced the holdings of Rappaport,
Soronen, and Linn in their logical progression to come to the conclusion that, based upon the facts before it, one further extension
140. Id.
141. Id. at 216, 356 A.2d at 17-18.
142. Id. at 217, 356 A.2d at 18. Citing State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 501, 129 A.2d 715,
719 (1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1957), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 975 (1959), the superior
court went on to state that
"The days when substantial justice must be sacrificed for the sake of blind adherence
to strict technicalities long since outmoded have passed in this State and are, we
hope, beyond recall." Thus, our goal is to do substantial justice in light of the mores
and needs of our modern day life.
140 N.J. Super. at 218, 356 A.2d at 18-19.
143. 140 N.J. Super. at 220, 356 A.2d at 19.
144. Id. at 219, 356 A.2d at 19.
145. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 548-49 n.8, 476 A.2d at 1224 n.8.
146. 185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (Law Div. 1982).
147. Id. at 479, 449 A.2d at 564.
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of liability was warranted. 4" As such, the superior court held that
there was
no reasonable basis for limiting the holding of Linn to minors, and this
court finds it to be the law of this state that a social host who furnishes
alcoholic beverages to any obviously intoxicated person under circumstances
which create a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to others may be held
legally responsible to those third persons who are injured when that harm
occurs. 49

This examination of the precedent cited in Kelly reveals that the
common law negligence theory in New Jersey had progressed to
the point where Kelly would be considered a logical and natural
extension of the principles that had developed before it. Indeed,
far from being categorized as an inconsistent, radical departure
from New Jersey precedent, 150 Kelly may be viewed as a mere ratification of the holding in Figuly.
The precise issue in Kelly-whether civil liability should be visited upon a social host for the consequences of the drunken driving
of an adult guest-has met with much controversy due to a substantial conflict of public policy considerations.' 5 ' As a result,
many courts have refused to judicially impose liability, declaring
was competent to adequately and justly
that only the legislature
52
issue.
the
resolve
The rationale of the Kelly decision reflects and typifies the pol148. Id. at 479-80, 449 A.2d at 564-65.
149. Id. at 480, 449 A.2d at 565.
150. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 561, 476 A.2d at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
151. See infra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
152. Illustrative of this view are the following cases: Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100,
375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup.Ct. 1975), aff'd mem., 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976), where
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, stated:
The implications of imposing civil liability . . . are vast and far-reaching. Extending
Just a recitation of a
liability to non-sellers would open a virtual Pandora's box ....
few of the considerations involved herein impels this Court to conclude that any exIn the final analysis, the controltension of liability should be a legislative act ....
ling consideration is public policy, and any extension of liability should be carefully
considered after all the factors have been examined and weighed in our legislative
process, that is, after extensive hearings, surveys and investigations.
Id. at 103, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 552. Likewise, in Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp., 460 F. Supp. 80
(D.D.C. 1978), the District Court for the District of Columbia stated:
Valid policy considerations exist on both sides of this issue, and the Court is not
prepared to adopt for the District of Columbia a rule not judicially imposed by any
other court in any other jurisdiction. If such a rule is to become a part of District of
Columbia law, the decision should appropriately be made by the legislature . . ..
Id. at 82 (footnotes omitted). For a comprehensive listing of other cases espousing this view,
see Kelly, 96 N.J. at 561-62, 476 A.2d at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
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These
icy arguments in favor of imposing social host liability.'
policy arguments may be concisely enumerated as follows: first, to
deter the drunk driving which has reached epidemic proportions in
our society; second, to prevent the injury and death of innocent
third parties; and third, to adequately compensate those made the
victims of the drunk driver."6 4 It is beyond dispute that the above
policies are laudatory. What is not settled is what role the social
host should play in the controversy, and whether that role can only
be competently defined in the legislature where hearings, debates
of policy considerations, and the weighing of testimony to balance
the needs and interests of society can be conducted.
The opponents of social host liability stress the grave burden
which is placed on the average citizen when social host liability is
made available. 56 The policy considerations embodied in this view
are generally demonstrated by comparing and contrasting the social host with the commercial licensee. The conclusion drawn by
this opposing view is that the imposition of liability upon the licensee is entirely justified, whereas a similar imposition upon the social host, the average citizen, would be excessively burdensome. 1 "6
The dissimilarities between a social host and a licensee may best
be discerned from four different arguments which are frequently
advanced by the opponents of social host liability. First, it is maintained that a significant difference centers on the average citizen's
lack of knowledge and expertise in assessing levels and degrees of
intoxication, whereas licensees are confronted with the problem
daily. 157 Second, it is contended that another distinction stems
from the nature of home entertaining in terms of how the consumption of liquor is controlled and monitored.'6 8 Third, a major
153. See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 551, 476 A.2d at 1226 ("The goal we seek to achieve here is
the fair compensation of victims who are injured as a result of drunk driving. . . . The rule
").
in this case will tend also to deter drunken driving ....
154. See supra notes 104, 142, 153 and accompanying text.
155. ,See, e.g., Kelly, 96 N.J. at 560, 476 A.2d at 1230 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (as a
result of majority holding, unduly onerous burden placed on every New Jersey citizen who
"pours a drink.").
156. In contrast to social hosts, licensee/vendors have repeatedly been the objects of
civil liability for the torts of their drunken patrons. For example, the whole focus of dram
shop legislation is upon the "licensee." For a discussion of licensee/vendor liability, see
Comment, supra note 100, at 1122. See also Comment, Social Host Liability for Furnishing
Alcohol: A Legal Hangover?, 10 PAc. L.J. 95, 102 (1979), for a discussion of the distinctions
between a social host and a licensee.
157. For a discussion of the particulars of this contention, see supra note 51. See also
Comment, supra note 156, at 102-03.
158. For a discussion of the particulars of this contention, see supra note 51. See also
Comment, supra note 156, at 103-05.
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distinction advanced is the social host's inability to comply with
his duty even when the host knows that a particular guest, such as
an employer, is intoxicated.1 59 Finally, and what is articulated to
be the most significant distinction between a social host and a
commercial licensee, is the social host's inability to spread the cost
of liability. 16 0
Kelly v. Gwinnell, as a supreme court decision, definitively establishes the law in the state of New Jersey. Nevertheless, the substantial controversy which has surrounded the imposition of liability upon a social host renders the propriety of the judicial
determination in Kelly subject to questioning, and possibly even
legislative annulment. In fact, the New Jersey Legislature now has
three options before it: first, the legislature can abrogate the Kelly
decision by expressly prohibiting social host liability as was done
in California;1 61 second, it can limit the Kelly holding to specific
situations where a social host will be held liable as was done in
Oregon; 16 or finally, it can do nothing and allow the common law
negligence evolution in New Jersey in the area of social host liability to remain intact.6 3 As a brief expos6 of each option will reveal,
however, none of the three is a completely palatable alternative
and the decision among them, unfortunately, must be along the
lines of a "lesser of the three evils" rationale.
As noted, one option would be for the New Jersey legislature to
expressly abrogate the Kelly decision by statute, and, in essence,
re-establish in New Jersey the traditional common law rule of nonliability for social hosts.1" However, when this option is viewed in
light of the fact that, despite the increasingly stringent measures
159. For a discussion of the particulars of this contention, see supra note 51. See also
Comment, supra note 156, at 105-06.
160. For a discussion of the particulars of this contention, see supra note 51. See also
Comment, supra note 156, at 106-07.
161. See supra notes 120 and 125 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 123 and 126 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 128-50 and accompanying text.
164. Such a result appears likely in light of Assembly Bill 43, recently introduced into
the New Jersey legislature. This bill provides in pertinent part as follows:
No person, other than a person licensed . . . to sell alcoholic beverages, who furnishes
any alcoholic beverages, to a person at or over the age at which a person is authorized
to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages shall be civilly liable to any person or
the estate of any person for personal injuries or property damage inflicted as a result
of intoxication by the consumer of the alcoholic beverages.
A.43, 201st. Leg., 1st Sess. (1984). See Note, 89 DICK L. REV. 537, 548 n.106 (1985) (view that
only the legislature is competent to decide the issue of social host liability and that in the
present case, Assembly Bill 43 would in fact be enacted to abrogate the Kelly decision).
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being taken against the drunk driver, 6 5 highway fatalities resulting
from drunk driving have reached epidemic proportions,'"6 it would
seem a less than prudent course to pursue. Stated otherwise, it is
not inherently unfair to hold a social host to some degree of liability when that host has unreasonably contributed to the innocent
67
loss of life.1
A second option would be for the legislature to do nothing at all
and allow social host liability to continue to develop in New Jersey
on a case-by-case basis, governed by the principles of common law
negligence as set forth in Kelly." 8 While this option has the appealing feature of theoretically placing liability upon those deemed
to be at fault, it is undeniably a radical departure from the historical common law rule of non-liability for social purveyors of alcohol. 6 When this fact is coupled with the significant policy considerations inherent in the distinctions between a social host and a
commercial licensee, 70 it is submitted that should such a burden
be placed on the average citizen, it should only be done following a
considered deliberation by the legislature. If society has indeed
grown intolerant of drunken driving to the point that it is willing
to endorse social host liability, regardless of the burden involved,
society should articulate such a desire through its elected
representatives.
The third option appears to be the least of the three evils. This
option would entail the New Jersey legislature limiting the holding
in Kelly by statutorily defining the specific situations that give rise
to social host liability, such as where a social host served a minor
or a visibly intoxicated individual.' 7' The virtue of this option lies
first in the recognition that serving alcohol to a minor or to a visibly intoxicated person can safely and fairly be said to reflect an
165. For an illustration of the increasingly stringent measures being taken against the
drunk driver, see New Versus Old Law: A Comparison Chart, 5 PA. L.J. RpmR. 510 (March'
28, 1983).
166. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text. In the balancing of the various
policy considerations, it is unreasonable to conclude that the compelling policy arguments in
favor of some social host liability should be given absolutely no effect in light of the policy
considerations advocating social host non-liability.
168. See supra notes 19-30 and 163 and accompanying text.
169. For a discussion of the historical common law rule, see supra 101-03 and accompanying text. For a listing of jurisdictions in which the traditional common law still controls,
see Comment, supra note 100, at 1143 n.108.
170. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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unreasonable act on the part of a social host. 7 ' Second, as discussed previously, such a legislative proclamation would follow
hearings, debates of the policy considerations involved, and a
weighing of testimony to balance the needs and interests of society.
It would, in essence, represent a mandate from society.1 73
As noted, none of the options is without flaw. The principal flaw
embodied in this final option would be that a social host would
seemingly be charged with a duty identical to that of a commercial
licensee-a strict standard of conduct. 17 The harshness of such a
result, however, would be mitigated in two ways: first, by the recognition that such a standard was societally endorsed,17 5 and second, by the realization that the issue of whether or not a social
host served a minor or a visibly intoxicated person would be a
question of fact for the jury. 7 6 Given this latter consideration, the
factual distinctions between a social host and a licensee could be
raised at trial. It would then be for the trier of fact to consider the
differences and determine the appropriate weight to be given them
in light of the facts before it.
Although the New Jersey legislature may soon be exercising the
"California option" by expressly prohibiting social host liability for
the torts of an adult guest in New Jersey, 7 7 the more judicious
172. Common experience and reflection reveal that this is an accurate statement.
What should be reiterated, however, is that a statutory enactment limiting liability to two
factual situations is more limited than a pure "case-by-case" negligence analysis. See e.g.,
supra note 126.
173. See e.g., supra note 152. Implicit in the language quoted and cases cited therein
is the fundamental principle that the legislature, as a representative body, will express the
will of the people.
174. Such would be the result because the enactment of a statute limiting "social
host" liability to instances where the host served a minor or a visibly intoxicated adult
would be identical to the traditional "dram shop" act which imposes strict liability upon a
"licensee" when it is violated. Commentators and courts have criticized the imposition of
identical standards of liability upon social hosts and licensees as being manifestly unfair
because of the distinctions between them. See generally Comment, supra note 156 (a primary theme of the comment is the inherent unfairness of subjecting a social host to the
same standard of liability as a licensee). See also Comment, The Torts of the Intoxicated:
Who Should Be Liable?, 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 33, 48 (1979). But see Comment,
supra note 100, at 1184 n.332 (because the harm caused by an intoxicated person is the
same regardless of the source of the intoxicating beverage, licensees and social hosts ought
to be held equally responsible under the law).
175. Implicit in the affirmative action of the legislature under this option would be the
legislature's awareness of the distinctions between a social host and a licensee, yet at the
same time its resolve that some liability should be imposed on both classes of parties.
176. As the remainder of the text indicates, the jury could consider proffered evidence
as to the distinction between a social host and a licensee in its deliberation on whether a
particular defendant did in fact serve a minor or a visibly intoxicated adult.
177. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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course for the legislature to pursue would be one structured after
the final option discussed. By stipulating that social host liability
may arise when a host serves a minor or a visibly intoxicated adult,
the legislature would be expressing the belief that it is not unreasonable to impose liability upon one who unreasonably contributes
to the innocent loss of life by furnishing alcohol in situations where
a foreseeable risk of serious harm to others is obvious. The additional virtue of this option is that, while a burden would indeed be
placed on the average citizen, such a burden would in essence be
imposed by society itself through its legislative representatives.
Therefore, the most prudent balancing of public policy considerations by the New Jersey state legislature would consist of a course
of action structured after the above. Undoubtedly, the conviviality
of a social host may be diminished when the potential for civil liability exists, but this must be balanced with the "serious hazard to
the lives, limbs, and property of the public at large, and the great
potential for human suffering which attends the presence on the
' '17 8
highways of intoxicated drivers.
Paul A. Verardi

178.

See Coulter, 21 Cal. 3d at 154, 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540.

